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ABSTRACT
Smart contracts are Turing-complete programs running on the
blockchain. They cannot be modified, even when bugs are detected.
The Selfdestruct function is the only way to destroy a contract on
the blockchain system and transfer all the Ethers on the contract
balance. Thus, many developers use this function to destroy a con-
tract and redeploy a new one when bugs are detected. In this paper,
we propose a deep learning-based method to find security issues
of Ethereum smart contracts by finding the updated version of a
destructed contract. After finding the updated versions, we use
open card sorting to find security issues.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, decentralized cryptocurrencies have attracted con-
siderable interest. Ethereum [12] is the most popular blockchain
platform that supports the running of smart contracts. Smart con-
tracts are Turing-complete programs that run on the blockchain.
They cannot be modified, even when bugs are detected.
The Selfdestruct function [4] is the only way to destroy a contract
on the blockchain system and transfer all the Ethers on the contract
balance. Many developers choose to add it to their smart contracts.
Thus, when emergency situations happen, e.g., bugs are found by
attackers, developers can use Selfdestruct function to destruct the
buggy contracts and transfer Ethers to reduce the financial loss.
When bugs are patched, developers can redeploy a new contract.
In this paper, we first crawl all the verified (open-sourced) de-
structed smart contracts from Etherscan [3], a famous Ethereum
smart contract explorer. Then, we download other smart contracts
that are deployed by the same creators of the destructed contracts.
After that, we proposed a deep learning-based method to compute
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Figure 1: Overview architecture of finding Ethereum smart
contracts security issues by comparing history versions
the similarity between different codes. If the similarity of a contract
with a destructed contract is higher than a threshold, we regard
the contract is the updated version of the destructed contracts. Fi-
nally, we manually analyze the difference to summarize the security
issues.
2 METHODOLOGY
Figure 1 depicts the detailed steps to identify security issues by
comparing history versions. Our method consists of three stages.
In the following parts, we introduce the details of each stage.
2.1 Stage 1. Data Collection
Stage 1 is used to collect data for the following two stages. Our data
contains three parts, i.e., verified contracts, self-destruct contracts,
and contract transactions. Verified Contracts are the open sourced
smart contracts crawled from Etherscan. We totally obtained 54, 739
verified contract in our dataset. Among these smart contracts, 756
contracts are destructed smart contracts. Transactions on Ethereum
record the information of the external world interacting with the
Ethereum network. In the first transaction, we can find who de-
ployed the contract (creator), and we can find who destructed the
contract (destructor) in the last transaction. We collect all 413,796
transactions of 756 self-destruct smart contracts.
2.2 Stage 2. Upgrade Contracts Selection
The aim of stage 2 is to find the upgrade version of a destructed
contract.
Step 2.1 Cluster: We first find the creator addresses of all the
54,739 verified smart contracts through their transaction. Then, we
classify the contracts into several groups according to their creator
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addresses. If two contracts have the same creator address, they
will be classified into the same group. We only choose groups that
contain self-destruct contracts.
Step 2.2 Rank by Time: We first rank contracts in each group
by their creation time, which can be obtained from the first trans-
action. Then, we can obtain several pairs; each pair is consisted of
a self-destruct contract and a live contract. For example, one group
contains five contracts, they are contract a,b,c,d,e and these five
contracts are ranked by creation time. Contract b and d are the
self-destruct contact in these five contracts. Finally, we output four
pairs, i.e., (b,c), (b,d), (b,e) and (d,e).
Step 2.3 Text Similarity: We compute the code similarity be-
tween two contracts to identify whether the later created contract
is the successor contract of the self-destruct contract. We first gen-
erate ASTs (Abstract syntax trees) of each smart contract. Then, we
parse the ASTs by an in-order traversal. During the parsing, all the
statements of the contracts are recorded. After the parsing, we re-
move or replace all the variables, punctuation marks, and different
types of constants to remove the semantic-irrelevant information.
Next, we embed the contracts by using Fasttext [5] as it performs
better than word2vec [10]. Finally, we calculate the similarity of
the contracts. If their similarity is larger than 0.6, they might be
relevant, and we assume the later created contract is the upgrade
versions of the self-destruct contract. We found 436 self-destruct
contracts have their upgrade contracts with 1513 <self-destruct con-
tract, upgrade contract> pairs. We note that 0.6 is a conservative
threshold; we might include many irrelevant pairs in our dataset,
but it will not influence our result as we conduct a manual analysis
in the subsequent step. Increasing the threshold can remove some
irrelevant pairs to reduce the manual effort, but it might make us
miss some true matching pairs.
2.3 Stage 3. Security Issues Summarization
In stages, we aim to find the security issues by comparing the
difference between a self-destruct contract and its upgrade version.
Step 3.1 Longest Common Substring: Longest Common Sub-
string (LCS) algorithm is to find the longest string (or strings) that
is a substring (or are substrings) of two or more strings. To reduce
the manual efforts, we use LCS to find the different parts of the two
contracts.
Step 3.2 Open Card Sorting: We follow the open card sort-
ing [11] approach to analyze the smart contracts and summarize
the reasons why they were destructed. We create one card for each
pair<self-destruct contract, upgrade contract >. The detailed steps
are:
Iteration 1: We randomly chose 20% of the cards, and two
developers with 3 years of smart contract development discussed
the reason why contracts destructed. If the reason of self-destruct
is unclear or irrelevant to the security issues, they omitted them
from our card list. All the reasons are generated during the sorting.
Iteration 2: The same two smart contract developers inde-
pendently categorized the remaining 80% cards into the initial clas-
sification scheme. If a new security issue is found, they discuss to
verify whether the new security issue is reasonable.
Step 3.3ReasonGeneration:We finally found 4 security issues,
and the detailed information is shown in the following section.
3 RESULT
We totally find four security issues, i.e., Unmatched ERC20 Contract,
Limits of Permission, Unchecked External Call, and Nested Call.
1. Unmatched ERC20 Contract. ERC20 [1] is the most popular
standard interface for tokens in Ethereum. If the implementation
of token contracts does not follow the ERC20 standard strictly, the
transfer between tokens may lead to errors. For example, ERC20
requires a transfer function to return a boolean value to identify
whether the transfer is successful. Users usually use third-party
tools to manipulate their tokens, and these tools capture token
transfer behaviors by monitoring the standard ERC20 method [7].
If the contract does not match the ERC20 standard, the token may
fail to be transferred by third-party tools.
2. Limits of Permission. Since Ethereum is a permission-less net-
work, everyone can call the function of a smart contract. However,
some contracts miss checking the permission of some sensitive
functions, e.g., Ether transfer, which leads to serious security is-
sues.
3. Unchecked External Call. Solidity provides a series of external
call functions, e.g., address.send(), address.call(), address.delegatecall().
These methods may fail due to network errors or out-of-gas error.
When errors happen, these methods will return a boolean value
(False), but never throw an exception. If callers do not check the
return values of external calls, they cannot ensure whether code
logic is correct.
4. Nested Call. Instruction CALL is very expensive (9000 gas paid
for a non-zero value transfer as part of the CALL operation). If a
loop body contains CALL operation but does not limit the number
of times the loop is executed, the total gas cost would have a high
probability of exceeding the gas limitation because the number of
iterations may be high and it is hard to know its upper limit.
4 RELATEDWORK
Chen et al. [6] define 20 smart contract defects on Ethereum by
analyzing the post on StackExchange [2] and divide them into five
categories, i.e., security, availability, performance, maintainability,
and reusability defects. Oyente [9] is the first tool for security ex-
amination for smart contracts based on symbolic execution. Their
work introduces four security issues on smart contracts, i.e., mis-
handled exception, transaction-ordering dependence, timestamps
dependence, and re-entrancy attack. Kalra et al. [8] proposed a
tool named Zeus, which can detect seven kinds of security prob-
lems; four of them are the same with Oyente; the other three issues
are failed send, interger overflow/underflow, and transaction state
dependence.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a method to identify the security issues
by comparing history versions. We first crawl all verified contracts
and their transactions from Etherscan. Then, we divide crawled con-
tracts into several groups by their creators’ addresses. In this case,
we can find smart contracts that are created by the same authors.
Next, we compute the code similarity of contracts in each group to
find self-destruct contracts and their upgrade version. Finally, we
summarize four security issues by using open card sorting.
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